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Introduction
Prescription drug expenditures make up less than 10 percent of
total personal health care expenditures in the United States, but
over the last decade the amount that Americans spend on
prescription drugs has grown much faster than any other
component of personal health care (see Appendix Figures 1 and
2). For example, between 1999 and 2000, hospital care costs rose
about 5 percent, physicians and clinical services 6 percent, while
prescription drug expenditures climbed more than 17 percent. In
dollar amounts, prescription drug expenditures doubled, from $61
billion to $122 billion, between 1995 and 2000.
Is this an unwarranted expense that needs to be controlled, or
does it represent increased value, as pharmaceuticals substitute
for older, more costly treatments? What is the prevalence of
health insurance coverage for prescription drugs, and how does
this affect specific populations who have limited or no drug
benefits? What are the components of drug prices? And what do
we need to consider when we design health care policy?
Stephen Soumerai and Patricia Danzon look at several aspects of
pharmaceutical drug usage and pricing in the United States,
illustrating their observations with their published research
findings. They then briefly review recent legislative proposals to
broaden public insurance coverage for prescription drugs and
make their own policy recommendations.
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Stephen Soumerai
There is a strong economic and public health rationale for
guaranteeing access to prescription drugs. For many people,
access to prescription drugs is highly correlated with adequate
insurance coverage for outpatient prescription drugs. If we look
only at the aggregate growth of insurance coverage, we don’t see
the problems that certain subgroups of Americans have obtaining
adequate health insurance: older people, poor people, and those
who are underinsured.
Uninsurance
An estimated 38.7 million Americans (14 percent of the total
population) were without any form of health insurance in 2000,
down slightly from the previous year (U.S. Census Bureau 2001).
This decline in lack of coverage was widespread and affected
most demographic groups, with one significant exception: among
Americans with income between the poverty line and 125 percent
of poverty, the share without health insurance increased two
percentage points, from 25 to 27 percent, between 1999 and
2000. And the share of poor and minority Americans without
health insurance remained well above the national average: 19
percent of African Americans, 32 percent of Hispanics, and 30
percent of poor Americans lacked health insurance of any kind in
2000.
Underinsurance
The original Medicare, the public health insurance program that
covers virtually all older Americans, was designed to provide
coverage for the big health care expenses that people faced in
1965, mainly hospitalization and doctors’ treatments. But it does
not include outpatient prescription drug benefits. Extremely lowincome Medicare beneficiaries may qualify for Medicaid, which
covers prescription drugs. Other Medicare beneficiaries who
want drug coverage have to purchase supplemental insurance
(Medigap), switch from fee-for-service Medicare to a Medicare
HMO, or qualify for prescription discounts under one of the state
sponsored plans (like New York’s Elderly Pharmaceutical
2
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Insurance Coverage, EPIC). Some pharmaceutical manufacturers
have begun to offer their own discount plans for low-income
seniors (Pear and Petersen 2002). Yet a disturbing number of
Medicare beneficiaries have limited or no drug benefits.
Bruce Stuart and his colleagues, using data from the Medicare
Current Beneficiary Survey, analyzed the sources and duration of
prescription coverage maintained by Medicare beneficiaries in
1995 and 1996. They chose a two-year period to distinguish true
losers and gainers from those who move into and out of coverage
over time, and to capture changes at the beginning of the calendar
year (Stuart, Shea, and Briesacher 2001). They found that
although about 70 percent of all beneficiaries had coverage at
some time in the first year, and even more had coverage at some
time over both years, fewer than half (46.3 percent) had
continuous drug coverage over the full two-year period. Thus,
about 30 percent of the sample had gaps in their prescription
coverage at some point during the two years.
Even the 46 percent who have continuous coverage don’t always
have access. Some Medicaid programs cap the number of
prescriptions as low as three per month. Two-thirds of Medicaid
programs require copayments ranging from $0.50 to $5.00 per
prescription (National Pharmaceutical Council 2000). The three
standard Medigap policies with drug benefits (H, I, and J) have a
$250 deductible, 50 percent coinsurance, and a $1,250/$3,000
annual cap (HCFA 2001). Even Medicare HMOs, to which many
Medicare beneficiaries have turned for drug benefits, are starting
to clamp down on those benefits in an effort to stay afloat (Rector
2000).
Appendix Table 1 illustrates out-of-pocket costs per year for
pharmaceutical drugs under different types of insurance
coverage, based on a hypothetical total of $2,000 per year over
55 prescriptions (DHHS 2000, Table 2-23). The Medicaid
recipient, with a $2.00 copay per prescription, pays $110; the
Medicare beneficiary with Medigap H, I, or J pays an average of
$1,125; and the Medicare beneficiary with no supplemental
insurance pays the entire $2,000 out of pocket.
3
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Copays, coinsurance, caps, and other limits on prescription drug
coverage are particularly burdensome for three vulnerable
populations: the elderly, the poor, and those with multiple
chronic health problems. As Adams, Soumerai, and Ross-Degnan
wrote in 2001, “A Medicare drug benefit that includes high cost
sharing without catastrophic coverage is likely to miss the
poorest and sickest” (p. 276).
Adverse Impact of Limited Drug Coverage on Vulnerable
Populations
What are the adverse effects of limited drug coverage, based on
the evidence from the best controlled studies? In low-income
populations, it reduces use of clinically important medicines like
insulin and cardiac medications, and it increases use of
institutional services like hospitalization and nursing home
admissions, which tend to be permanent among the elderly.
Among schizophrenic patients and other groups with chronic
mental illnesses, it increases day hospital use and acute mental
health and emergency mental health care. A series of three
studies in The New England Journal of Medicine (Soumerai et al.
1987, 1991, 1994) strongly suggest that coverage limits increase
total health care costs for these at risk patients.
Soumerai and colleagues conducted several analyses comparing
changes in prescription drug usage of both essential and
nonessential drugs, among Medicaid beneficiaries in New
Hampshire under two different regimes in the 1980s (a three
prescription per month cap during one year, replaced by a $1
copayment the following year) and New Jersey, which had no
cap (Soumerai et al. 1987, 1991, 1994; Fortess et al. 2001). Their
first study (1987) used data from 48 months of claims in both
states, including a baseline period. Among more than 10,000
continuously enrolled patients in New Hampshire, the imposition
of a monthly three-prescription cap reduced the number of
prescriptions filled by 30 percent; no change was noticed during
the same time period in the comparison state. Those who used
multiple prescriptions, predominantly female and elderly or
disabled, were hardest hit; their filled prescriptions dropped by 46
4
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percent. When a $1 copayment replaced the cap, most
prescription fills returned to nearly the same level as before the
cap, but not for patients receiving multiple drugs.
In 1991 Soumerai and colleagues reported the effects of the same
New Hampshire Medicaid drug benefit cap on the health of
Medicaid recipients aged 60 and older who were taking three or
more medications per month before the cap, including at least
one maintenance drug for certain chronic diseases, compared to a
similar sample in New Jersey. Again, prescription drug usage
declined substantially, by 35 percent, among the New Hampshire
sample when the cap was imposed. This decline was associated
with a significantly increased risk of admission to nursing homes,
although not to hospitals. When the cap was discontinued, the use
of medications returned to nearly pre-cap levels, and the added
risk of admission to a nursing home ceased. However, nothing
could turn back the clock: the authors note that, “in general, the
patients who were admitted to nursing homes did not return to the
community” (p. 1072). This was the first time that a study
actually demonstrated a link between coverage policies and an
outcome like permanent institutionalization.
Three years later they looked at the effects of the New Hampshire
Medicaid cap on the use of psychotropic drugs and acute mental
health care services by permanently disabled, noninstitutionalized
Medicaid recipients diagnosed with schizophrenia, ages 19
through 60 years of age (Soumerai et al. 1994). Imposition of the
cap resulted in “immediate reductions (range 15 to 49 percent) in
the use of antipsychotic drugs, antidepressants and lithium, and
anxiolytic and hypnotic drugs....It also resulted in coincident
increases of one to two visits per patient per month to
[community mental health centers] (range of increase 43 to 57
percent)...and sharp increases in the use of emergency mental
health services and partial hospitalization (1.2 to 1.4 episodes per
patient per month), but no change in the frequency of hospital
admissions. After the cap was discontinued, the use of
medications and most mental health services returned to base-line
levels.” During the cap there was an increased use of emergency
mental health services that are only provided in New Hampshire,
5
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a special service to prevent institutionalization for people who are
having a psychotic episode. This indicates that a coverage cap
can actually cause psychotic episodes among schizophrenic
patients, because these services were only provided for people
who had severe schizophrenic illness occurring at that time.
Furthermore, in this study the cap clearly had a negative effect on
overall Medicaid program costs: “the estimated average increase
in mental health care costs per patients during the cap ($1,530)
exceeded the savings in drug costs to Medicaid by a factor of
17.”
Tamblyn and colleagues took a somewhat different approach,
looking specifically for adverse events, “defined as the first
occurrence of acute care hospitalization, long-term care
admission, or death” (2001, 424), among low-income and elderly
beneficiaries of a Canadian public insurance program in the
1990s. In 1996, the province of Quebec legislated mandatory
drug insurance coverage for all residents. To finance their
program, they instituted a deductible and 25 percent coinsurance
for all recipients, including low-income and elderly persons who
had previously received free prescription drugs. (Bear in mind
that the current legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress are
more like 50 percent cost sharing.) The random sample included
94,000 elderly persons and 55,000 low-income adults with
Medicaid benefits. Data were drawn for periods before and after
the deductible and coinsurance requirements were imposed. After
cost sharing was introduced, use of both essential and
nonessential prescription drugs dropped in both populations,
although not as significantly as in the New Hampshire samples.
The authors observed that “increased cost sharing for prescription
drugs had the desired effect of reducing the use of less essential
drugs but also the unintended effect of reducing the use of drugs
that are essential for disease management and prevention” (p.
427). The rate of serious adverse events associated with reduced
use of essential drugs increased from 5.8 per 10,000 personmonths to 12.6 in the elderly sample, and from 14.7 to 27.6 in the
low-income sample. Emergency department visit use rates
associated with reductions in the use of essential drugs also
increased by 14.2 per 10,000 person-months in elderly persons
6
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and by 54.2 among the low-income persons (Tamblyn et al.
2001).
Policy Recommendations
The Kaiser Family Foundation has published a comparative study
of all of the proposals for drug benefits for Medicare
beneficiaries that are being discussed in Congress (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2001). We’re dealing here with political viability.
We’re dealing with Democrats who want to have universal
coverage, and Republicans who want more private coverage and
more selective coverage for vulnerable people. What has
happened, however, is that the majority of proposals now favor
thin, which means not very good, universal coverage. Why?
Political exigencies are forcing us to cover everybody, but we
can’t afford it. It’s as simple as that.
Congressional proposals say, in a nutshell, let’s provide really
thin coverage to everybody, even those people who don’t
necessarily need it. High deductibles, and catastrophic coverage
so that after $4,000 to $6,000 of out-of-pocket costs people then
will get coverage. Rely on the self-purchase private insurance
market, despite the fact that these private plans have very high
cost sharing and result in less use of essential medications. All of
these systems are voluntary, which are political realities, I guess.
In 1999, Dennis Ross-Degnan and I wrote in The New England
Journal of Medicine that the time was ripe for “a federal-state
program to cover poor, near-poor, and low-income Medicare
beneficiaries who are ineligible for Medicaid....Such an
incremental approach would target the elderly and disabled
persons with the greatest economic and clinical need, would build
on existing federal-state programs, and would be affordable”
(page 722). We referred to the demise of the Catastrophic
Coverage Act as a missed opportunity, the failed Clinton Plan for
health care as a missed opportunity, and now we’ve got a new
opportunity. Let’s not blow it again. We need a bipartisan
compromise. We went to Washington and talked to a lot of
senators and aides about this problem; they said we’ve got to
7
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compromise or else nothing’s going to happen. At that time, we
said that with the current budget surplus, as well as bipartisan
concern about drug costs and coverage, it’s time to act
responsibly and aggressively.
Have we missed our chance? I hope not. There was a big chance
a couple of years ago, but there was no compromise. I’m hoping
that there will be a chance again soon.
Ideally, everybody in Medicare—elderly, disabled people—
should have access to prescription drugs, and other people as
well. But available solutions are controversial, and we need
compromise.
Our first principle is that poor and low-income people, maybe up
to 200 percent of poverty, have an urgent need for an immediate
unlimited benefit, because these are the people—we have data
now from many environments and countries—for whom limited
access to prescription drugs actually affects their health and
ultimately their ability to live independently. Limited drug
coverage, especially for low-income people, reduces uses of
essential medications that doctors clearly do not want to see
reduced, nor does the clinical literature. It increases adverse
costly outcomes such as institutionalization, hospitalization, and
even mortality.
So what should be the priorities in coverage? To quote from our
recent article in the Journal of General Internal Medicine:
We recommend an approach that recognizes the
urgent need of low-income beneficiaries for an
unlimited benefit with low copayments. We estimate
that a substantial portion of the costs of providing
coverage to this group, whose lack of economic
access to drugs results in low utilization and
undertreatment of important chronic illnesses, would
be offset by reduced use of institutional services. In
addition, no one should become impoverished by the
need for essential medications. The second priority
8
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should be to provide universal protection against very
high drug costs (e.g., after $3,000 in out-of-pocket
costs). Such an approach will have a larger impact on
health than thin coverage for everyone, including
those who do not currently need any public
assistance. (Soumerai, Adams, and Ross-Degnan
2001, 865)
An approach like this will have a larger impact on health than the
so-called thin coverage that’s being promoted for all
beneficiaries, with up to 50 percent cost sharing and huge
deductibles. Even so, there are still going to be people at the
borderline who will not get their medications.

Patricia Danzon
My doctorate is in economics, which is known as the dismal
science. So, after the heartwarming and caring concern expressed
by Steve, it is my less pleasant task to talk about some of the hard
numbers, the business side of things. Both perspectives are very
important, and I think that our views of the solutions are quite
similar.
Pharmaceutical Drug Spending Growth
If we step back to ask what actually drove the increase in
spending that was described in the introduction, and which has
been quite out of line in the 1990s compared with previous
trends, our analysis suggests:
•

the single most important factor driving this growth in
spending is the growth of insurance coverage.

The proportion of Americans with some form of health insurance,
86 percent, has remained fairly constant for more than a decade.
In 2000, about 238 million people in the United States were
covered by some form of health insurance, including virtually
everyone age 65 and older. But over the same time period an
increasing fraction of both the under 65 and the over 65
population obtained some drug coverage, primarily as private
9
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insurers added outpatient prescription drugs to their standard
benefits.(Danzon and Pauly 2001; Briesacher and Stuart 2002,
Table 1).
When we compared two population surveys, one done in 1987
and the other in 1996, and we looked at the under 65 population,
those who had at least one prescription and some insurance
coverage increased from 51 percent to 83 percent. Most of the
people in the under 65 population who had a prescription now do
have coverage (Danzon and Pauly 2001). And the people who
don’t have prescription drug coverage are primarily the people
without any health insurance coverage, some of whom are young
adults, ages 18 to 24. They were the least likely to have health
insurance coverage, 72.7 percent, versus 86 percent overall, in
2000 (U.S. Census 2000). Interestingly, in the senior population
we also found that there was a dramatic increase in the
percentage with coverage; this may have declined recently with
the exit of HMOs from Medicare Plus Choice.
Between 1965 and 1998, the proportion of prescription drug
expenditures covered by private insurance increased from
virtually nothing (3.5 percent) to slightly more than half (52.7
percent), while the proportion paid out of pocket declined from
nearly the entire amount (92.6 percent) to about one-quarter (26.6
percent) (Figure 1). By comparison, over the last decade the share
of total personal health expenditures, hospitals, and physicians
paid out of pocket, has remained steady, at about 17 percent, 3.2
percent, and 12.5 percent respectively (HCFA 2000). This
massive shift from direct to indirect payment for prescription
drugs is a major underlying cause of expenditure growth, as
consumers and prescribing doctors become less aware of and less
sensitive to the financial impact.
I’m not saying that lack of drug benefits is not a problem. I am
saying that during the 1990s there was an increase in coverage,
which contributed significantly to the growth in spending. The
fact is that when people have insurance they spend more, they use
more prescriptions, and they have higher costs per prescription.
To some extent this reflects what economists call the moral
10
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hazard effect of insurance. We don’t mean it is immoral; we
simply mean that when somebody else pays, you use more
expensive drugs. And to some extent it reflects the fact that
people, especially in the under 65 population who need coverage
or need drugs, are more likely to buy coverage. This is called
adverse selection, the tendency for people who need drugs or
other medical services to buy insurance coverage for that service.
Figure 1. Percentage of Drug Spending by Source of Payment:
Private Insurance, Out-of-Pocket, and All Others, 1965-1998
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We estimate that about one-quarter of the real spending growth
for outpatient pharmaceuticals between 1987 and 1996 is
attributable to growth in insurance coverage (Danzon and Pauly
2001). Although the United States is still far from having
universal coverage, in fact there has been a big increase and that
has, not surprisingly, contributed to the growth in spending.
Volume, Mix Upgrade, and Unit Price
In addition to the overall effect of increased prescription drug
insurance benefits, three other factors contribute to increases in
prescription drug spending:
•

Volume (utilization), the average number of
prescriptions per capita, has increased.

11
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•

Mix upgrade, from older, less expensive drugs to newer,
more expensive drugs. Some of these newer drugs replace
existing treatments, and some treat diseases that were
previously untreatable. Between 1986 and 1999, the
number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) approved by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration increased (FDA
2001). Among these are such drugs as Gleevec (for
chronic myeloid leukemia, approved in 2001; for
gastrointestinal stromal cancer, 2002), several new AIDS
medications, Singulair (for asthma, 1998), Celebrex and
Vioxx (arthritis, 1998 and 1999), Xenical (obesity, 1999),
and of course Viagra (erectile dysfunction, 1998). Newer
drugs tend to have higher prices, and the switch to new
drugs raises expenditures. Of course many of these newer
drugs offer improvements in long-term health and quality
of life, but they also cost more.

•

Price inflation of existing drugs, which on average
contributes the least to spending growth.

Affordability
Turning to the issue of affordability, we hear a lot about the
prices of drugs. But for seniors the main issue is not prices but
drug coverage. If seniors were able to enroll in managed drug
plans, they would benefit from the same discount on prices as
those of us who are already in managed drug plans.
You may not be aware of this, but so-called pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs) negotiate significant discounts on prices with
manufacturers. They also negotiate significant discounts on the
pharmacy dispensing fees, all of which significantly reduce the
price per script for people with managed drug coverage relative
to people without. The anomaly in the United States is that the
people without coverage pay relatively high prices and relatively
high dispensing fees compared to those with coverage. That
comes about simply because of the negotiating power of these
pharmacy benefit managers and other managed care institutions
that manage the pharmacy benefit. If seniors received this type of
12
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managed benefit, they would benefit from lower prices. This is
the way to approach the problem of affordability, as opposed to
controlling prices, because pharmacy benefit managers do a good
job of negotiating discounts, which makes price controls
unnecessary.
But if we expand coverage, then we have to recognize that
insurance is a mixed blessing. While insurance gives people
financial protection, the flip side is higher usage. In every type of
medical service, people with insurance use more. We have to
expect that as we expand insurance coverage, there will be more
utilization, which will drive up expenditures. That is part of the
battle going on in Washington; they recognize that having
insurance coverage will drive up drug spending.
Of course, there are ways to control costs once we have insurance
coverage. The early generation managed care plans used tightly
controlled formularies. They negotiated with the drug
manufacturers for discounted prices and limited the number of
products that were covered to those on the formulary.
With the managed care backlash, there is now reluctance to have
closed formularies, so PBMs are switching to greater reliance on
copayments to control costs. The plans now use triple tier
copayments, which require, say, $5.00 copayment for a generic
drug, say $15.00 for a preferred brand, and maybe $25.00 or
$30.00 for a nonpreferred brand. In some ways this managed care
backlash is unfortunate, because we are moving to a form of
insurance coverage that has a lot of copayment, hence more
financial exposure for patients, rather than relying on the other
controls that managed care once used.
Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: An International Issue
The single most important factor that distinguishes
pharmaceuticals from other industries is the importance of R&D.
The pharmaceutical industry spends 15 to 20 percent of their
sales on R&D, compared to an industry average of about 4
13
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percent (PhRMA 2001a). The average cost of bringing a new
drug to market is now estimated at $800 million and upwards
(DiMasi 2001). The reason the cost is so high is partly the cost of
discovery and clinical trials to show that drugs are safe and
effective. But it is also the cost of the failures, the so-called dry
holes, that has to be averaged in with the cost of the successes. It
takes a long time, 6 to 15 years, to take a drug all the way from
discovery through clinical trials to market launch.
The good news is that R&D now uses new technologies to
develop new drugs. With biochemistry and genomics and rational
drug design, new drug targets have enormous promise. But all of
this is expensive, so the costs of R&D are projected to increase.
The significant thing about the R&D costs, for purposes of
pricing, is that R&D is a fixed and sunk cost. In other words, the
cost must be incurred before the drug can be marketed, and then
there is no incremental cost for every additional patient served.
By contrast to the high cost of R&D, the marginal cost of serving
additional patients, the cost of producing another pill, is very low.
So the industry relies on patents to stop prices from falling
because if prices fall to marginal cost, just the cost of production,
nobody is paying for R&D and manufacturers would have no
incentive or ability to invest in R&D for the future. Thus,
intellectual property protection is crucial to the viability of the
research-based pharmaceutical industry.
R&D is also a joint cost, which is not just an issue for the United
States but is also an enormous international dilemma. R&D, once
done, can serve consumers anywhere in the world. So the
question is, who will pay? There is no way of attributing R&D to
the Italians or the U.S. or the U.K. For each country, there is a
great incentive to free ride, to wait for somebody else to pay, and
that is indeed what some countries with very tough price
regulation do. They pay relatively low prices and contribute very
little to R&D. But if everybody pays only marginal costs, then no
one pays for the joint costs, and there will be no R&D.

14
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The economic question is, what is the best way of organizing the
payment for this joint cost of R&D? When you have a joint cost
such as pharmaceutical R&D, or electric utility capacity, the most
efficient pricing—the form of pricing that gives the highest
overall social welfare—is differential pricing. Everybody does
not pay the same price; prices differ across different patient
groups, depending on their price sensitivity, or price elasticity of
demand. Elasticity is measured by answering the question, how
much would you cut back if you faced a higher price? The
principle of differential pricing is that price sensitive consumers
or countries should pay lower prices, and less price sensitive
consumers should pay higher prices (Danzon 2001).
Price Sensitivity
It’s very difficult to measure price sensitivity, but in general it is
highly correlated with income. Thus, one practical implication of
this principle is that it is appropriate for higher income countries
to pay higher prices for drugs, and for lower income countries to
pay less.
Differential pricing does not imply cost-shifting. As I wrote in
1999:
Simple economic theory shows that if a firm serves
two separate customer groups, say A and B, that
differ in their price sensitivity, the firm would
maximize its overall net revenue by charging
different prices in the two markets. It would charge a
higher price in the market that is less price-sensitive,
say market A, other things being equal. If demand in
market B now becomes more price-sensitive, the firm
will lower its price in that market. But the price to the
less price-sensitive market A is unaffected—indeed,
to raise price to group A would actually reduce net
revenue, since by assumption it had already set the
price to maximize net revenue in that market. By
analogy, increased price-sensitivity in the managed
care market has led suppliers to offer discounts in
15
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that market, but this does not affect prices to other
customers. (p. 23)
A few years ago I reviewed studies that compared prices for
pharmaceuticals in the United States and other countries (Danzon
1999). The most recent studies claimed that the United States had
prices 70 percent higher than Canada, or 102 percent higher than
Mexico. But these widely cited price comparisons use small,
unrepresentative samples—typically, 10 top branded products—
and faulty methods that lead to biased conclusions. These studies
overstate U.S. prices because they do not include rebates given to
managed care and government purchasers. Furthermore, more
than 42 percent of drug purchases in the United States are
generics, yet these are omitted from most price comparisons.
We are undertaking a study at Wharton to look at a large sample
of products, including the generics and the branded products. We
have included all the different presentations and packs, calculated
appropriate measures of price indices to compare prices, and
looked at both manufacturer-level prices and the prices to final
consumers. Unfortunately, we do not measure the discounts; they
are confidential. It is too early to give the detailed results of that
study, but I can give you some general findings. The first
conclusion from our analysis is that there is no single right
measure: we cannot accurately say that Canada is X percent
cheaper than the U.S. But the general conclusion is that the
previous studies have overestimated the average differences. The
U.S., on average, has higher prices for new originator products,
but the U.S. has the lowest generic prices in our sample of nine
countries. The U.S. also has the lowest over-the-counter drug
prices. So when you average it all in, the differences are smaller.
Another finding is that countries with regulation have much less
competition and do not have large generic shares or low generic
prices. Regulation undermines competition. Interestingly, when
we compare Canada not just to the U.S. but to other European
countries, we find Canada has among the lowest prices. This
reflects in part the decline in the Canadian dollar over the last
decade.
16
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Our final interesting finding was that although the U.S. does have
higher prices somewhat on average than other countries, our
differential for drugs is less than the differential on prices of
other medical services such as hospital care and physician
services. So the U.S. has higher prices for all types of medical
care, not just drugs.
Unfortunately, current policies are undermining the price
differences that exist. The European Union permits parallel
trade, in other words, wholesalers can import products from
countries that charge lower prices to countries that charge higher
prices for the same products. We in the United States are talking
about permitting reimportation, in other words, permitting
wholesalers to import products from countries with lower prices.
Further, governments increasingly are regulating their domestic
prices based on prices in other countries. This means that the low
prices in lower income countries are now spilling over to higher
income countries, which has the unfortunate effect of eliminating
the low prices for low-income countries. Manufacturers are
rationally becoming much less willing to give low prices in lowincome countries.
This issue received broad coverage in the context of AIDS drugs
in Africa, where the prices seem way out of line with the very
low income levels there. The affluent countries look at the prices
in these other countries and say “We want those low prices.”
When that happens, manufacturers are unwilling to give anyone
low prices. My conclusion is that uniform pricing is not efficient
or equitable, and it leads to the severe problem of unaffordably
high prices in lower income countries.
This still leaves a question and a concern for the vulnerable
populations who are low-income in this country. They also can
not pay high prices in this country. We therefore have to be a lot
more serious about finding a drug coverage program that really
allows those people access. If we could get seniors into managed
pharmacy coverage, they would benefit from the discounts that
those with drug coverage already have, and they would not be
facing prices as high as they currently do.
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Furthermore, we should not address the problem of higher prices
in this country by trying to import lower prices from abroad,
which would very adversely affect lower income countries. We
may well, because of the political process, find a way to pay
lower prices in the United States, but if we do we will get less
R&D and fewer new drugs.
Policy Recommendations
The examples that Steve has showed us tend to be from
vulnerable populations who, if faced with copayments, will cut
back on their use of drugs. For the more affluent populations, we
know from studies of other types of medical care that as much as
30 percent of the procedures done are inappropriate and not
necessary. It suggests that insurance, which makes
consumers/patients insensitive to cost, leads to overutilization
and unnecessary use. The challenge in designing a drug benefit is
providing enough coverage to benefit people who are really
vulnerable, without encouraging overutilization or excessive
switching to expensive, unnecessary drugs.
There is no perfect solution. We agree that using copayments is
inappropriate for the low-income and needy. However, it is a
very appropriate way of giving choice to higher income people
while constraining the overuse that results from moral hazard.
Copayments should be targeted at upper income people who can
afford them, while lower income people should be protected.
We also agree that the coverage proposals proliferating in
Washington, which would give seniors 50 percent copay up to
about $4,000 or $5,000 worth of coverage, provide a very poorly
designed drug benefit. A better drug benefit would give full
coverage to lower income people, have significant cost sharing
for higher income people, and catastrophic coverage. That is
Insurance 101: insurance is supposed to protect people from
expensive unpredictable events, not cover routine costs you can
afford.
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You may ask yourself, is it just that people in Washington do not
understand these obvious principles of insurance? The
unfortunate reality is that the reason they design these plans to be
50 percent copay is that if instead a plan has a big deductible with
no coverage until, say, $500 is spent, then the great majority of
seniors would not see any benefit from their coverage. Therefore
they would choose not to buy the plan.
Everybody seems to agree that the coverage should be voluntary,
not mandatory, because of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act fiasco, which was a mandatory drug benefit. Many
seniors opposed that vehemently because they did not want
mandatory coverage in that form. Now, all the plans offer
voluntary coverage. But if coverage is voluntary, then it is
necessary to design the benefit so that the lower risk people will
choose to buy the coverage. Otherwise only the sickest people
will join the plan, which makes it costly and perhaps unstable.
Politically it is not appealing if your political opponent can say
“Your plan will only cover 50 percent of the people.”
The fact that the plan only pays benefits to 50 percent of the
people is not a design defect, because most people will not have
drug expenses high enough to reach the limit of the deductible,
which triggers benefit payment.
Unfortunately, political constraints are leading us toward a very
poorly designed drug benefit. The worst case scenario could be
that we have a poorly designed benefit, which is very
comprehensive for some people, and then we add price controls
because the cost escalates beyond budgeted levels. That would be
a very unfortunate resolution of the drug coverage debate. But
political forces, as opposed to ignorance of insurance principles,
are driving us in that direction.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Appendix Figure 1. Personal Health Care Expenditures,
Aggregate Amounts, by Type of Expenditure
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Source: HCFA 2000, Table 2.
Appendix Figure 2. Personal Health Care Expenditures, Average Annual
Percentage Change, by Type of Expenditure
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Appendix Table 1. Illustration of Out-of-pocket Costs under Different Coverage Sources for a
Beneficiary with Total Spending of $2,000
Source of drug coverage
HMO ($7.50 copay, $1,500
1
cap)
Medigap H/I/J ($250
deductible, $1,250 or $3,000
2
cap, 50% coinsurance)
1
Employer ($7.50 copay)
1
Medicaid ($2 copay)
Medicare FFS only
Notes:

Deductible

Copay

Over cap Total out-ofpocket

Percent paid
out-of-pocket

--

$412

$88

$500

25%

$250
----

$875
$412
$110
--

-----

$1,125
$412
$110
$2,000

56%
21%
6%
100%

1

For non-Medigap plans, typical cost sharing rules are assumed; there are plans with higher
and lower cost sharing. The $2,000 spending was divided by the average cost of prescriptions
for Medicare beneficiaries with drug coverage ($36.37) to generate the number of
prescriptions (55) used for the examples in this table. The cap on HMO payments applies to
spending by the plan.
2
For Medigap plans, out-of-pocket spending in this table is calculated directly from the dollar
amount of spending ($2,000). After the beneficiary has met the $250 deductible, Plans H and I
will cover 50% of $2500 in total spending, for a total plan payment of $1250. Plan J will pay a
total of $3000.
This table does not attempt to account for premiums paid or the different purchasing power
that $2000 might have under different discount arrangements negotiated by HMOs,
employers, and Medicaid.
Source: DHHS, Report to the President: Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization,
and Prices, April 2000, Table 2-23.
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